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Abstract
The owner of a residential property subject to a nonrecourse mort-
gage essentially has a put option against the market value of the prop-
erty. If the market price of the property falls su¢ ciently, the owner can
surrender the property to the mortgage issuer and in exchange receive
full o¤set of the cash ow liability of the mortgage loan. A similar
but diluted put optionality holds for recourse mortgages if there are
legal or practical limits to the mortgage issuers recourse claim against
the owners future income. Previous research based on American data
nds that put optionality is an important, but not exclusive, determi-
nant of mortgage default. This paper utilizes a database of troubled
Irish mortgages to analyze the inuence of put optionality on Irish
property ownersdefault behaviour. We nd that put optionality is a
very important explanatory variable for observed Irish mortgage de-
faults, complementing and strengthening existing empirical ndings
from US mortgage markets.
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1 Introduction
The owner of a residential property subject to a nonrecourse mortgage who
is willing to renege on his loan essentially holds a put option against the
market value of the property. If the market price of the property falls su¢ -
ciently, the owner can surrender the property to the mortgage lender and in
exchange receive full o¤set of his cash ow liability from the mortgage loan.
In options terminology, the homeowner has a long-term American put option
on a dividend-paying asset (the implicit rental yield of the property serves
as the dividend ow) with exercise price equal to the cash-equivalent value
of the mortgage liability. The moneyness of the put option is one minus the
reciprocal of the loan-to-value ratio of the mortgage. A similar, but diluted,
put optionality holds for recourse mortgages, since there are legal and prac-
tical limits to a mortgage lenders recourse claim against the owners future
income, for example, relief from this claim through personal bankruptcy. In
most situations, both the homeowner and mortgage lender incur substantial
transactions costs upon exercise by the homeowner of this put option. This
two-sided transactions-cost feature of the put option leads to a bargaining
game between the homeowner and mortgage lender, with the homeowner po-
tentially able in some circumstances to gain mortgage payment concessions
by threatening to surrender the asset but not doing so. The bargaining power
of the mortgage borrower in default seeking repayment concessions increases
with the moneyness of the put option.
Particularly in the case of a recourse mortgage, there are reputational
costs and social/ethical considerations for the homeowner from defaulting,
since in doing so the homeowner has violated the terms of an agreed contract
for personal gain. In many cases, the mortgage lender will continue to re-
ceive (more valuable) required mortgage payments even when options theory
predicts that it will be forced to accept surrender of the property.
Most existing Irish residential mortgages are contractually written to be
full recourse and with unhindered security against the property. However, in
recent years a number of legislative and regulatory changes have altered the
de facto nature of mortgage claims. Irish residential mortgages are now, in
practice, limited-recourse contracts and have strictly limited security against
the property asset, and high transactions costs for the mortgage lender in
exercising the security claim. Given the extremely large falls in Irish res-
idential property values during the period 2008 to 2012, it is sensible to
examine whether put optionality helps to explain the explosive increase in
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Irish mortgage arrears over roughly that same period.
This paper empirically examines the inuence of put optionality on the
default behaviour of Irish mortgage borrowers. We rely on a large database
of Irish mortgages provided to us by a mortgage lender in Ireland, Permanent
TSB. The database covers all mortgages at Permanent TSB for which the
holder has submitted a Standard Financial Statement (SFS), giving a sample
of 28,377 mortgage accounts. Submitting an SFS is a required component of
the Central Bank of Irelands mandated mortgage arrears resolution process
(MARP). The entry of a mortgage borrower into MARP is either at the
initiation of the bank after one or more missed mortgage payments or, less
commonly, by the mortgage borrower looking to engage with the bank for
help with their mortgage payment di¢ culties. The sample is doubly-censored
since it consists only of mortgages which have been brought into MARP, and
does not include troubled mortgages which should be in MARP but where the
mortgage borrower has refused to submit the required SFS. Our data panel
consists of information from the SFS collated with information from the
original loan application and some other loan-specic data items. Roughly
half the mortgages in our sample are in default, dened as greater than 90
days worth of accumulated payment arrears, and half are not in default.
Our main empirical task is to build a model explaining which of this ob-
served subset of all mortages, that is the subset of mortgages in MARP where
the mortgage borrower has submitted an SFS, are in default, and which are
not in default. We use a combination of analysis of variance, multivariable
probit models and nonparametric and semiparametric kernel-based estima-
tors. We nd that put optionality is a signicant explanatory variable for
Irish mortgage default. The loan-to-value ratio, which measures the money-
ness of the implicit put option, is the most powerful variable in generating
di¤erences in average default rates across portfolios of loans double-sorted
by levels of explanatory variables. In a multivariate probit model of mort-
gage default, loan-to-value is again the most important explanatory variable,
measured by marginal contribution to the probability of default. The put-
optionality e¤ect is particulary strong when combined with household income
stress, supporting the "dual trigger" model of mortgage default. Whereas in
US data, a¤ordability is generally found to be more important than put-
optionality as a predictor of default, within our (doubly-censored) Irish sam-
ple, put-optionality appears more important than a¤ordability as a predictor
of default.
Using nonparametric and semiparametric methods, we nd some evidence
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for an options-type convexity in the functional link of loan-to-value to mort-
gage default probability. This convex relationship also conforms to ndings
in US-based research on the e¤ect of loan-to-value on mortgage default rates.
Section two reviews the existing literature and critically examines the
insights which options theory can provide regarding mortgage default behav-
iour in Ireland. Section three describes our econometric model of mortgage
default. Section four empirically examines the default behaviour of mort-
gages in our database. Section ve summarizes the paper.
2 Optionality and Mortgage Contracts
There is a large research literature examining the impact of the implicit put
option in mortgage contracts on default behaviour by mortgage borrowers.
The empirical component of this research is mostly based on US mortgage
market data. We will briey review a few of the papers with particular
relevance.
The original insight for modeling mortgage default as a put option is cred-
ited to Asay (1978). Deng et al. (2000) show empirically that a continuous-
time, frictionless market, Black-Scholes-type theory of mortgage default as
put option exercise provides useful empirical content, but is not su¢ cient as
an empirical model. Unlike the exercise of a securities-market traded put
option on a stock, defaulting on a mortgage has large xed costs, and a po-
tentially large impact on the future economic opportunities of the mortgage
borrower, particularly through its impact on their personal credit rating and
the availability of new mortgage nance to them. Deng et al. also note that
mortgage default is not fully "rational" in the sense of cash-ow maximizing 
there are moral/social/psychological aspects to the default decision. Most of
the recent literature does not rely on the continuous-time, frictionless market
assumptions of Black-Scholes type models.
Elmer and Seelig (1998) build a model of mortgage default which com-
bines both inability-to-pay and put-optionality as causes of default. Us-
ing US data aggregated at the state and regional level, they nd that both
causes play a role in mortgage default, but that inability-to-pay is relatively
stronger. The data used in the paper pre-dates the volatile US property price
declines of the post-2007 period.
Using loan-level data, Tirupattur et al. (2010) conclude that defaults
driven by negative equity, rather than ability to pay, are a signicant phe-
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nomenon in US residential mortgages over their sample period. A borrower is
dened as strategically in default (that is, exercising their put option) when
their mortgage goes from current to 30-, 60- and then 90-days in arrears
without any payment during this period or any subsequent payments, while
the borrower continues to service non-mortgage loans. Strategic defaults in-
crease over time in concert with the decline in US residential property prices
and by the end of the sample (February 2010), they represent 12% of all
defaulted mortgages. Wyman (2009) uses a similar approach and estimates
that by second quarter of 2009, 19% of all defaults were strategic.
Bhutta et al. (2010) build a theoretical model of mortgage borrower
default decisions combining inability-to-pay and put-optionality reasons for
default. They test the model using a loan-level database, combined with
micro-regional property price indices, covering several US states with large
property price declines (and business cycle recessions) in the post-2007 pe-
riod. They nd that, considered separately, inability to pay is the more
important source of default decisions, but that put optionality also plays a
prominent role. They nd that when negative equity exceeds 50 percent of
the propertys value, half of the defaulters are exercising their put option
rather than experiencing any inability to pay. Also, Bhutta et al. argue
that their empirical ndings support Footes (2008) "dual-trigger" model of
default default is highest when householders experience both simultaneous
income falls and negative equity increases. The two causes of default interact
and reinforce each other.
Bhutta et al. note that a contributory factor in strategic default is the
long "free-rent" period between original default and repossession; this period
lasts at least eight to twelve months in most US states, dependent upon the
specic legal statutes of the state. The implicit cash value of the free-rent pe-
riod adds to the put-optionality payo¤ from default and further incentivizes
strategic default. Cutts and Merrill (2008) look in detail at cross-state dif-
ferences in the length of the free-rent period associated with necessary legal
delays in the repossession process. They nd that states with relatively
shorter periods have generally better outcomes in terms of cure-rates (the
proportion of households with mortgages in arrears that get back on track
and keep their property). They estimate an "optimal" repossession interval
of 270 days from original missed payment to physical repossession, consist-
ing of 150 days of customer counseling/assistance with mortgage arrears, a
default declaration notice by the lender, and then 120 days before physical
repossession.
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Relying on survey data, Guiso et al. (2011) nd that social considerations,
such as morality and fairness, inuence borrowers on the acceptability of
strategically defaulting. They estimate that in their sample 26% of existing
defaults are strategic. They nd that almost no households will deliberately
choose to default (given ability to pay) if negative equity shortfall is less
than 10% of the value of the house; 17% of households will choose to default
even if they can a¤ord to pay their mortgage when negative equity reaches
50% of the value of the property. Burke and Mihaly (2012), also based on
survey data, nd that social perceptions about the acceptability of strategic
default, and nancial literacy (the ability to navigate the US bankruptcy
system) inuence households tendency toward strategic default. Seiler et
al. (2012) report that networks are an important determinant of strategic
default: borrowers who have family and friends in default are more likely
to strategically default themselves. Towe and Lawley (2010) also nd that
social interactions play a signicant role in the decision to default, in that
having a neighbour in foreclosure increases the probability of default by 28%.
Elul et al. (2010) use an econometric framework somewhat similar to
our own. They dene default as accumulated arrears of 60 days or more,
and estimate a logit model of binary default outcomes based on individual-
credit-record data, together with nationwide quarterly interest rate data and
quarterly US state-level unemployment rate changes. They nd that both
negative equity, which they interpret as put-optionality, and inability to pay
have a signicant e¤ect on mortgage default probability. They also nd that
the two causes interact, so that mortgage default rates are particularly high
when negative equity is combined with stressed ability to pay. Elul et al. also
explore the possibility of a nonlinear impact of negative equity on mortgage
default rates and nd some conrmatory evidence.
Trautmann and Vlahu (2011) build a game-theoretic model of borrower
runs: the tendency of borrowers to deliberately choose default when they
perceive balance sheet weakness at the lending bank. Borrowers know that
weak banks are likely to be less aggressive in quickly repossessing property,
and also that the long-term relationship of the borrower with the bank has
less value if the bank is weak. Since borrower loan nonpayments aggravate
the weakness of the banks balance sheet, borrower runs can self-reinforce in
the same way as bank depositor runs.
The bargaining-game perspective of Trautmann and Vlahu highlights an
important bargaining-game benet to strategic default which increases as
the moneyness of the implicit put option increases. Mortgage borrowers are
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aware that the lending bank must pay a large transactions cost in repossessing
a property, and that the bank would benet if it could negotiate reduced-
value payment terms rather than repossess a negative-equity property. If the
bank does not have full recourse to all the borrowers future income, then
negative equity in the loan creates a gap between the present value of full
mortgage payments and the present value of the minimum mortgage pay-
ments that the bank will hypothetically accept to avoid costly repossession.
Strategic default (particularly in Ireland where repossession is very costly
and di¢ cult for banks) can be employed as a credible threat in negotiations
for improved payment terms. Given the structure of Irish mortgage contracts
(limited recourse, very costly repossession, banks with weak balance sheets)
this is likely to be an important consideration in the Irish case.
Lydon and McCarthy (2011) provide an analysis of Irish mortgage market
default based on data collected from four Irish banks during the Central
Bank of Irelands 2010 stress-testing review of the domestic banking sector.
Like Elul et al. (2010) and this paper they use a static probit model of
mortgage default based on individual loan characteristics. They argue that
their static probit model results support a dual-triggermodel of default
in which both a¤ordability and put-optionality (that is, high loan-to-value
ratios) impact household mortgage default. They also nd that the regional
unemployment rate, as a proxy for local economic shocks, has an impact on
regional average default rates. Using a dynamic model applied to regional
loan portfolios rather than individual loans, they can not condently identify
a put-optionality e¤ect on default for regional home loan portfolios, but the
e¤ect is statistically signicant for regional buy-to-let loan portfolios.
One obvious concern is the applicability of US-based research for mod-
eling the default behaviour of Irish mortgage borrowers. There are impor-
tant social, cultural, regulatory, and legal di¤erences between U.S. and Irish
residental mortgage markets. The Irish legal and regulatory environment
has not been constant over the our sample period. Starting with the 2009
Land Reform Act, which contained a legal aw rendering residential prop-
erty repossession virtually impossible in Ireland, there have been a variety
of changes to repossession, bankruptcy, and personal insolvency laws and
regulation. The legal aw in the 2009 Land Reform Act was eventually re-
moved after sustained pressure from Irelands international lenders under the
sovereign bail-out programme (the International Monetary Fund, European
Central Bank and European Union). From an international perspective, the
current Irish system is borrower-friendly and repossession is slow and costly;
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see Mac Coille et al. (2013) for a review. Coincidentally or otherwise, dur-
ing the economically-turbulent period in which these regulatory and legal
changes to mortgage contract enforcement were implemented, Irish mort-
gage arrears grew explosively. Figure 1 compares the time-series patterns
of Irish mortgage defaults, the unemployment rate, per capital real income,
and residential property prices over the period Q4 2002 - Q2 2013; all the
series are normalized to 100 at the starting date of mortgage default data
availability, Q3 2009.
3 Linear, Nonparametric, and Partially Lin-
ear Index Probit Models of Mortgage De-
fault in a Panel Dataset
3.1 Linear Index Probit: A Brief Review
Our basic econometric model is a linear-index probit model of default. We
assume that for each mortgage, the mortgage borrowers default outcome is
based on an unobserved (by the econometrician) decision index vi; if vi > 0
then the mortage holder defaults. Each mortgage borrowers decision index
is a linear combination of a k vector of explanatory variables xi with linear
coe¢ cients  plus an unobservable individual-specic random component "i
capturing default-relevant idiosyncratic e¤ects:
vi = 0 + 
0xi + "i (1)
and we assume that "i has a standard normal distribution and is independent
across mortgage borrowers. Let di denote the observable binary variable
which is 1 if the mortgage borrower has defaulted and 0 otherwise. Let ()
denote the cumulative probability function of a standard normal variate.
Given observation of fdi; xigi=1;:::;n maximum likelihood estimation of (0; )
is straightforward:
(0; ) = argmax
(0;)
1
n
nX
i=1
di log((0 + 
0xi))+ (2)
(1  di) log(1  (0 + 0xi))
which is easily solved by nonlinear maximization and gives consistent, as-
ymptotically normal estimates with consistently-estimated standard errors,
8
see, e.g., Greene (2000). The empirical results will be presented in the next
section. Readers who are not interested in the econometric technicalities re-
quired to allow nonlinearity in the decision index (1) may wish to skip ahead
to that section.
3.2 Nonparametric Estimation of the Link between Loan-
to-Value and Default
A potential weakness of standard probit, in our application, is the assumption
of a linear decision index (1). Options pricing theory predicts that the put-
option component of the value of default depends nonlinearly upon the loan-
to-value ratio. The exact nonlinear shape is not possible to derive due to
the complexity of the embedded put option. The put-option-based value of
default is near zero for loan-to-value below one and then slopes positively.
There is corresponding empirical evidence from US research that strategic
mortgage default is nonlinear in the loan-to-value ratio, which again argues
against the linearity assumption in the decision index.
In this subsection we analyze a probit model with a fully nonparametic
decision index. This model is theoretically estimable by maximum likelihood,
see Matzkin (1992), but it is not feasible in our application due to the curse of
dimensionality (we have six explanatory variables). Nonetheless we can use
the general model to estimate the conditional expected rate of default as a
function of loan-to-value. This conditional expectation function is estimable,
and can be compared to the predicted conditional expectation function im-
plied by the linear-index probit model. Comparison of the two estimates of
this conditional expectation function provides the basis for a nonparametric
test of index-linearity of the probit model. We are able to test the linear-index
probit model against a general nonparametric alternative without being able
to completely estimate the nonparametric alternative.
We replace the linear decision index with a nonlinear generalization:
vi = f(xi) + "i (3)
where f() is a thrice continuously di¤erentiable multivariate function. We
continue to assume that "i has a standard normal distribution and is indepen-
dent across i. We assume that for each i the vector of explanatory variables
xi is a realization from a multivariate joint distribution, independent of "i :
xi  D;
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with the restrictions on D described later. Let the rst component of xi;
that is x1i; be the loan-to-value ratio. Note that conditional upon a realized
value of xi and given knowledge of f(); the probability distribution for di
has the same form as in the case of linear-index probit:
Pr(di = 1) = (f(xi));
recall that () denotes the cumulative normal probability function. Since di
is a binomial zero-one this implies:
E[dijxi] = (f(xi)):
Recall that we assume that f() is a smooth multivariate function. We require
that the joint density of the explanatory variables, D, is su¢ ciently smooth
so that the following conditional expectation is well-dened and thrice con-
tinuously di¤erentiable in xi1:
g(x1i) = E[E[dijxi]jx1i] = E[(f(xi))jx1i]: (4)
Nonparametric regression provides a natural method for estimating g(x1i)
based on the conditional moment expression (4). In large samples, the con-
ditional expected default at a particular point x1i is consistently estimated
by the local-weighted average default in the neighbourhood of x1i :
p lim
n!1
1
Sn
nX
j=1
dj(x1j; x1i) = g(x1i) (5)
where (x1j; x1i) = dens(
x1j x1i
hn
) for some density function dens() and band-
width hn, and sum of weights Sn =
nP
j=1
dj(x1j; x1i): See the Technical Ap-
pendix for conditions guaranteeing the consistency and asympotic normality
of the estimator (5).
Note that this fully nonparametric model encompasses the linear-index
probit model as a special case. This allows us to test the linear decision index
against a fully nonlinear alternative without maximum likelihood estimation
of (3). First estimating the linear index probit model by maximum likeli-
hood (2), we then use the same kernel regression to estimate the conditional
expectation function using the estimated linear index probit model. Any
di¤erence between these two nonparametric estimates of the conditional ex-
pectations function captures a linear model bias of the probit model. Under
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the joint assumptions of this subsection and of the probit model in subsection
3.1 above:
p lim
n!1
1
Sn
X
(b0 + b0xj)(x1j; x1i) = g(x1i) (6)
where the kernel regression terms are identical to (5) above. See the Technical
Appendix for conditions guaranteeing consistency of the estimator (6). The
di¤erence between the unrestricted (5) and restricted (6) estimates of g(x1i)
we call the linear model bias.
3.3 Partially Linear Index Probit: A Brief Review
There are a number of semiparametric extensions of the standard linear pro-
bit model, designed to add exibility to the functional form without unduly
sacricing estimation accuracy. The partially linear index probit model is a
particulary appropriate model choice in our application. It sacrices some
of the exibility of the fully nonparametric model discussed in the last sub-
section, by imposing linearity for all but one of the explanatory variables.
The decision index is assumed to take the following additive semiparametric
form:
vi = f(x1i) + 
0
(1)x(1)i + "i (7)
where x(1)i is a (k   1) vector of the explanatory variables excluding the
loan-to-value ratio x1i and (1)is a (k  1) vector of associated linear coe¢ -
cients. The univariate function f(x1i) is assumed to be thrice continuously
di¤erentiable, and "i is standard normal. The intercept 0 is not included in
the model since it is not identiably separable from f(x1i).
We follow the estimation algorithm proposed by Carroll, et al. (1997). To
get initial values, the linear-index probit model (1) is estimated by maximum
likelihood (2). Then for a grid point x1i a local quasi-maximum likelihood
problem is solved for scalar estimate bfx1i :
bfx1i = argmax 1Sn
nX
i=1
(x1i; x1i)fdi log(( bfx1i + b0(1)x(1)i))+ (8)
(1  di) log(1  ( bfx1i + b0(1)x(1)i))g
where (x1i; x1i) is a kernel-weighting scheme and Sn is the sum of the kernel
weights. This local quasi-maximum likelihood problem is solved for each of
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a set of nely spaced grid points covering the sample range of x1i: A cross-
section of implied estimates for f(x1i) is found by interpolating between grid
points: bf(x1i) = bfx1i + (x1i   x1i)( bfx1i   bfx1i) (9)
where x1i > x1i are the two contiguous grid points containing x1i: Next, we
return to the linear-index probit maximum likelihood problem but replacing
0 + 1x1i with the pre-estimated bf(x1i) from (9):
b(1) = argmax
(1)
1
n
nX
i=1
di log(( bf(x1i) + 0(1)x(1)i))+ (10)
(1  di) log(1  ( bf(x1i) + 0(1)x(1)i)):
The two steps (8) and (10) are iterated to convergence. See Carroll, et al.
(1997) and Bellemare, et al. (2002) for discussion of convergence properties,
optimal bandwidth choice, and related issues. Our estimates appear in the
next section.
4 Empirical Analysis of Irish Mortgage De-
faults
4.1 The Database and Key Variables
Our database was provided by Permanent TSB bank and consists of all prop-
erty loans at Permanent TSB that have submitted a Standard Financial
Statements (SFS). The bank collates the information in the SFS with exist-
ing bank information on the loan account, including application information
and payment records.
The Central Bank of Ireland mandates that all mortgage lenders must col-
lect an SFS from each home loan mortgage borrower in arrears, as part of the
Mortgage Arrears Resolution Process (MARP). MARP is the Central Bank
mandated process that all regulated mortgage lenders must follow in deal-
ing with customer mortgage payment di¢ culties. Each regulated mortgage
lender must treat every loan which has been arrears of any amount for more
than 31 calendar days as in MARP and must write to the mortgage borrower
within 3 business days after these 31 days are elapsed and tell them that they
are covered by MARP. The lender must provide an SFS to the borrower in
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MARP, give them assistance in lling out the SFS as needed, and then must
pass the completed SFS to the Arrears Support Unit within the lending bank
which must follow specic regulations in dealing with each MARP case. If
the mortgage borrower fails to return the SFS then they can be classied
under Central Bank of Ireland regulations as a noncooperative borrower and
borrower protections under MARP may be lifted. Mortgage borrowers may
also voluntarily submit an SFS, for example in order to negotiate mortgage
restructuring without falling into arrears.
There are a total of 28,377 loan accounts in the database, 25,235 home
loan accounts and 3,142 residential property investor loan accounts (called
buy-to-let loans). Mortgage borrowers with both home and buy-to-let loans
are included in the buy-to-let loans gure. For each multiple-loan account
we aggregate the individual loan characteristics and e¤ectively treat it as
one loan observation. Taking account of borrowers with multiple loans the
database covers 37,547 individual home loans and 4,285 individual buy-to-let
loans; this compares to a total outstanding portfolio of 140,060 home loans
and 23,133 buy-to-let loans at Permanent TSB, so 23.7% of the banks total
home loans portfolio are in the database and 18.5% of its buy-to-let loans
portfolio. The database includes a default dummy for any loan that has
accumulated arrears of greater than 90 days. A multiple account is treated
as in default if accumulated arrears on any of the loans is greater than 90
days of required payments. Table 1 shows the percentages of the two loan
types in default in the database. In the Permanent TSB total loan book,
15.3% of home loans and 17.9% of buy-to-let loans are in default; this of
course di¤ers sharply from our database (SFS-linked loans only) with 48.7%
for home loans and 49.9% for buy-to-let loans in default.
In addition to the default dummy, the database has the "number of days"
of accumulated arrears (30 x arrears amount/monthly required payment).
Table 2 summarizes this data. This measure has the advantage over the de-
fault dummy that it captures the level of accumulated arrears rather than
only giving a binary indicator of default. However, the range of values runs
very high - half of the mortgages in arrears have almost a year (314 days)
of accumulated arrears. The di¤erence between a loan that is ve years in
arrears and a loan which is one year in arrears seems mostly a matter of
timing for when the default began, rather than a di¤erent decision by the
mortgage borrower. Also, there is extant research literature on mortgage
loan default but no comparable non-Irish data or research on multi-year ac-
cumulated arrears. Hence we focus on models explaining loan default rather
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than accumulated arrears.
There are two sources of censoring in our database, both of which limit the
general applicability of our empirical analysis. First, we only have informa-
tion on mortgages for which there is an SFS on le at the bank. Completely
non-distressed mortgages do not appear in our database, and so we do not
model their holdersdecision-making in choosing non-default.
The second source of censoring comes from imperfect compliance with
the Central Bank of Ireland requirement for an SFS for each troubled mort-
gage. It is not possible from the database to compute the compliance rate
for all mortgage types since SFS submissions can be required by the bank or
voluntarily chosen by the mortgage borrower. One exception is home mort-
gages in default, where submission of an SFS is mandated in all cases by
MARP. Permanent TSB records 21,398 home loan accounts in default, but
they have only 14,996 SFS submissions from home loan mortgage borrowers
in default, giving a SFS submission compliance rate of 70.1% for this sub-
category. The potential statistical interaction between the non-cooperation
decision of mortgage borrowers in arrears and our model of their mortgage
default decision (based only on data for those who have complied) limits
the applicability of our results for mortgages outside the conditioning set. It
seems possible that non-cooperation is more tempting for borrowers with cer-
tain characteristics, and these characteristics may also impact their default
decision-making. We can only o¤er the caveat that our model is of borrower
default outcomes conditional upon their submitting an SFS, and is not de-
pendable for non-cooperating borrowers, who are outside this conditioning
set.
We rely on six explanatory variables for loan default. Application LTV
is the loan-to-value ratio at the time the loan was issued (we also have the
date of issue, which we use in Table 3 below). LTV is the estimated current
loan to value ratio. The current loan to value ratio takes the most recent
physical valuation of the property available to the bank (for the majority
of loans this will be the valuation done at the application date, but it may
be more recent) and then uses a property price index to adjust forward the
valuation to account for price increases and/or decreases since the physical
valuation date. The forward price adjustment uses the most relevant of the
following four property price indices for each individual property: Dublin
houses, Dublin apartments, non-Dublin houses, and non-Dublin apartments.
The loan amount is adjusted for amortization or reverse-amortization of the
capital balance using the banks payment records on the individual loan.
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The payment to income index, or a¤ordability index for short, is dened
as required payment commitments divided by net income. Net income is the
after-tax income of the borrower (or multiple borrowers). The denition of
required payment commitments di¤ers between home loans and buy-to-let
loans:
Required payment commitments for home loans = existing short term
debt payments + existing mortgage payments + existing buy-to-let decit
+ maintenance costs + proposed buy-to-let decit + proposed mortgage
payments - tax relief.
Required payment commitments for buy-to-let loans = existing short
term debt payments + existing mortgage payments + existing buy-to-let
decit + maintenance + proposed buy-to-let decit - tax relief.
The same formulas are used for the application values and current values
of the a¤ordability index. The current values are at the date on which the
most recent Standard Financial Statement was received, and use information
provided by the household on the SFS.
The loan-to-value ratios for a multiple-loan account are computed as the
sum of the multiple loan amounts divided by the sum of the property values,
both currently and at the application date of the most recent loan. The
a¤ordability ratio for a multiple-loan account sums the required payment
commitments from all the loans and then divides by net income.
We examined the database for data outliers and other discernible errors.
The only notable problem we could identify was that 0 had been used in
some cases in place of missing data. Since all six of our explanatory variables
should be strictly positive, except in most unusual circumstances, we treat
all zero entries as missing. We truncated application LTV and LTV at 5.0,
and the a¤ordability index at 3.0, to dampen the inuence of extreme values
(which may be data errors) on the estimation routines. Table 3 shows the
number of mortgage entries in our database for each year of loan origination,
along with the number of data points truncated. The columns in the table
di¤er since some variables have missing data, particularly for application data
at earlier loan origination dates. Sixty-seven percent of the mortgages in the
database originate in the four years 2005-2008. Table 4 provides descriptive
statistics on the six explanatory variables. Table 5 shows the correlation
matrix of the explanatory variables.
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4.2 Estimation of the Model
As a preliminary step we double-sort all loans using each pair of the three
current variables: loan-to-value, payment-to-income, and log income, and
then compute the average default rate within each subset. For each variable
the rst breakpoint is the 25% fractile of its univariate distribution and the
second breakpoint is the 75% fractile, so that the middle category captures
the interquartile range. The interquartile range is (0:62; 1:42) for loan-to-
value, (0:28; 0:54) for payment-to-income, and (log(1; 802); log(3; 480)) for
log of net monthly income. The results appear in Table 6. All three of the
variables seem to contain information about default rates. The strongest
double-sort comes from using loan-to-value and log income together, but
all three variables show some explanatory power. The corresponding tables
for home loans and buy-to-let loans examined separately are shown in the
supplementary tables in the appendix.
The results in Table 6a are particularly interesting. For purposes of infor-
mal analysis the three columns in the table can be thought of as a¤ordable
payment, stressed payment, and una¤ordable payment; the three rows can
be thought of as positive equity, zero to moderate negative equity, and large
negative equity. Note that the (1; 1) subset (a¤ordable payment, positive
equity) has an average default rate of 43.4% whereas the (3; 3) subset (un-
a¤ordable payment, large negative equity) has a default rate of 70.6%. The
(3; 1) and (1; 3) subsets have roughly equal average default rates which are
not that much higher than for the (1; 1) subset. The big jump in the default
rate comes when the loan has both low a¤ordability and large negative eq-
uity: the joint e¤ect seems much bigger than the sum of the two individual
e¤ects. This conforms to Footes (2008) dual-trigger model of default, and
supports the US-based ndings of Bhutta et al. (2010) and Elul et al. (2010).
The probit model which we use below also captures this empirical feature.
Table 7 follows on from Table 6a. We subdivide the loans into those that
have undergone a decrease in a¤ordability since loan origination (for example
due to unemployment, lower household income, or higher short-term debt
obligations) and those have undergone an increase, and look at the default
rates for the three levels of current loan-to-value, using the interquartile
range for the middle loan-to-value category, as in Table 6. Both decreased
a¤ordability and the current loan-to-value ratio have an impact on default
rates, and the two e¤ects interact, as in Table 6.
We begin parameterized model estimation using a probit model with all
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six explanatory variables:
Prob(defaulti) = (0 + 1LTVi + 2A¤ordi + 3LogIncomei+
4AppLTVi + 5AppA¤ordi + 6AppLogIncomei
The results are shown in Table 8, for all loans in the database, and then for
the subsample of home loans and buy-to-let loans estimated separately.
Application-date a¤ordability index and application-date log income have
weak explanatory power in Table 8. In Table 9 we re-estimate the probit
models dropping these two variables. In Table 10 we show estimates of this
same model using the logistic distribution in place of the normal distribution.
We will focus on the probit model with four explanatory variables (Table 9).
The last two columns in Table 9 show the marginal impact on default
probability of a marginal change in each explanatory variable, calculated
two ways: using the sample average of the other explanatory variables, and
computed individually at each sample point and then averaged across the
sample. Both measures are used in the literature but the latter is generally
considered preferable; see Green (2000). Current log income has more impact
on the default decision than the current a¤ordability index. A strong and
surprising nding is the notable power of current loan-to-value in determining
Irish mortgage default decisions, as measured by these marginal probabilities.
This strong relative explanatory power is further increased by the fact that
current loan-to-value has a wider interquartile range than the a¤ordability
index and log income.
A key topic in the existing US research literature is measuring the pro-
portion of mortgage defaulters which are distressed (inability to pay) versus
strategic (put-optionality) defaults. The current loan-to-value ratio is the
key variate in a strategic defaulters decision calculus, whereas loan-to-value
has no role in a distressed defaulters decision calculus. The high explana-
tory power of current loan-to-value is evidence of strategic decision-making
playing at least a partial role (explicitly or subconsciously) by Irish mortgage
defaulters. The evidence indicates that Irish mortgage defaulters in our sam-
ple have mixed motives, inuenced simultaneously by stressed a¤ordability
and put optionality. Any "pure" strategic defaulters, with no a¤ordability
pressure and motivated solely by put-optionality, are more likely to be in the
30% or so of non-cooperating mortgage defaulters, who do not submit an
SFS and are not in our sample.
Lastly, we use nonparametric and semiparametric methods to examine
potential nonlinearity in the response of default to loan-to-value. We use
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the Gaussian kernel throughout and set the bandwidth h using Silvermans
rule of thumb, h = (4
2
d
3n
)
1
5 ;where 2d is the sample variance of observed de-
faults and n is the number of observations in the sample or subsample. We
estimate over the range 0 <LTV< 3 but note with caution that kernel meth-
ods are unreliable in the tails of the data range. The 99% middle range of
the data, leaving 0:5% in each tail of the sample, is (:06; 2:62) for all loans,
(:02; 2:28) for home loans, and (:17; 3:07) for buy-to-let loans. Nonparametric
or semiparametric estimates outside this middle range are untrustworthy.
Figure 2 shows unconditional expected default as a nonparametric func-
tion of loan-to-value using kernel-based nonparametric regression; see equa-
tion (5) in Section 3.2. Figure 3 takes the nonparametrically-estimated ex-
pected defaults from Figure 2 and compares them to the conditional expected
defaults from the probit model in Table 9; see equations (3) and (5) in Sec-
tion 3.2. There is evidence for the type of nonlinearity predicted by options
theory in Figures 2 and 3, with the response curves attening for LTV< 1
and curving upward at high LTV. Figure 4 shows the nonlinear LTV re-
sponse functions estimated by the partially linear index probit model (see
equation (7) in Section 3.2). The results are suggestive, but not denitive,
regarding a convex nonlinearity in the link between loan-to-value and loan
default; see Elul et al. (2010) for related evidence for the US market us-
ing di¤erent estimation methods (step-wise linearity over intervals in a logit
model). The convex nonlinearity, as reected in a nonzero linear model bias,
seems to start at a loan-to-value ratio of 1.5 for home loans. For buy-to-let
mortgages, the convex nonlinearity starts earlier, near a loan-to-value ratio
of 1.0. The coe¢ cient estimates for the other ve variables (for which the
linearity assumption is maintained) are shown in the supplementary tables
in the appendix.
5 Conclusion
Following the collapse of the Irish credit/property bubble, Irish residential
property prices fell sharply and mortgage arrears grew explosively. From
the peak in Q2 2007, residential property prices fell 50.3% to the trough in
Q2 2012, subsequently recovering 1.2% from the trough by Q2 2013. The
number of home mortgages in default (greater than 90 days of accumulated
arrears) grew 272.6%, from 26,271 in Q3 2009 to 97,874 in Q2 2013; as of
Q2 2013, 12.7% of home loan mortgages are in default. Data on buy-to-let
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defaults is only available recently so the growth path is not known, but 20.4%
of buy-to-let mortgages are in default as of Q2 2013.
Property price falls have been shown to have a strong causal link to house-
hold mortgage default decisions, in a wide range of studies using US data.
Although property resale price has no e¤ect on a households ability to pay
the mortgage, it has a large e¤ect on the implicit put-option value of mort-
gage default. Unless the lender has unhindered recourse to the households
future income, the holder of a negative equity mortgage can e¤ectively "put"
the property to the lender and in exchange stop paying the mortgage. This
put-optionality e¤ect on mortgage default has been shown to be particulary
strong when combined with household income stress. In the "dual trigger"
model of mortgage default, households are particularly likely to default when
household income stress is combined with large positive put-option value of
default, captured by a loan-to-value ratio substantially above 1.0.
This paper conrms key US-data ndings on recent Irish mortage data.
We rely on a data set which only contains borrowers within the Mortgage
Arrears Resolution Process who have submitted a Standard Financial State-
ment, so non-cooperating borrowers, and borrowers who have never experi-
enced mortgage di¢ culties, are censored from the data. Within this restricted
set of borrowers, the loan-to-value ratio is a very important, arguably the
most important, predictor of mortgage default. Our evidence supports the
dual-trigger model of default: Irish mortgage borrowers are most likely to de-
fault when income stress is combined with strong put-optionality as reected
in the loan-to-value ratio. The consensus view from US-based research is
that both a¤ordability and put-optionality a¤ect default rates, but a¤ord-
ability is the more important inuence. In our doubly-censored Irish sample,
put-optionality is a more powerful predictor of default than a¤ordability.
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Technical Appendix
This technical appendix contains background material on the nonpara-
metric regression estimation procedure presented in Section 3.2. First we
assume that the default decision index is fully nonparametric:
vi = f(xi) + "i
and wish the estimate the univariate nonparametric relationship between x1i
and expected default. Dene g(x1i) as conditional expected default:
g(x1i) = E[dijx1i] = E[ff(xi) + "ig+jx1i]
where fg+ equals one if the argument is positive and otherwise zero. In
order to implement nonparametric kernel regression, we assume that g() is
thrice continuously di¤erentiable. This imposes implicit assumptions on the
smoothness of f() and on D; the multivariate distribution of x; we take
this assumption as primitive, noting in passing that there are many explicit
special cases of f() and D which would justify the assumption. Let i denote
the mean-zero deviation of realized default from conditional mean default:
di = g(x1i) + i
where we assume that the density function of x1i is thrice continuously di¤er-
ential and that i has uniformly bounded conditional variance 2 (x1i): Using
the Gaussian kernel together with bandwidth h = cn 
1
5 to estimate bg(x1i)
by (5), we have by Theorem 2.2 in Li and Racine (2007):
d lim
p
nh(bg(x1i)  g(x1i)  b(x1i))  N(0; 2 (x1i)
dens(x1i)
)
where b(x1i) is a standard bias correction term; see Li and Racine, page 62.
In the restricted case, we rst estimate (0; ) under the assumption that
the multivariate probit holds, and then nonparametrically estimate bg(x1i)
using (6) applied to the predicted default rates from the estimated probit
model. We ignore the estimation error in (b0; b) since it converges to zero at
a faster rate than bg(x1i)  g(x1i): The same Theorem 2.2 from Li and Racine
applies in this case.
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 Table 1: Percentage Distributions of Loan Type and Default Rates 
 All Loans Home 
Loans 
Buy-to-Let 
Loans 
All Loans 100% 88.9% 11.1% 
% Loans in Default in 
the Category 
48.8% 48.7% 49.9% 
 
Table 2: Statistical Distribution of Days in Arrears for Loan Accounts with 
Nonzero Arrears 
 All Loans Home 
Loans 
Buy-to-let 
Loans 
10% Fractile 34 34 40.6 
25% Fractile 110 106 150 
Median 314 305 423 
Mean  451.8 443.8 516.8 
75% Fractile 662 642 766.3 
90% Fractile 1037 1034 1095 
 
  
Table 3: Data Distribution of Each Explanatory Variable Across Years of Loan 
Origination 
Year Application 
Payment-to-
Income 
Ratio 
Application 
Loan-to-
Value Ratio 
Application 
Net Income 
Payment-to-
Income 
Ratio 
Loan-to-
Value Ratio 
Net Income 
1999 or 
earlier 
5.27% 3.72% 3.08% 5.27% 5.27% 5.15% 
2000 2.55% 2.55% 2.17% 2.55% 2.55% 2.48% 
2001 2.75% 2.74% 2.39% 2.75% 2.75% 2.68% 
2002 3.65% 3.65% 3.22% 3.65% 3.65% 3.58% 
2003 5.98% 5.98% 5.89% 5.98% 5.98% 5.84% 
2004 8.76% 8.76% 8.75% 8.76% 8.76% 8.61% 
2005 13.92% 13.92% 13.92% 13.92% 13.92% 13.67% 
2006 21.30% 21.30% 21.29% 21.30% 21.30% 20.90% 
2007 19.00% 19.00% 18.88% 19.00% 19.00% 18.58% 
2008 13.22% 13.22% 12.87% 13.22% 13.22% 13.00% 
2009 2.83% 2.83% 2.82% 2.83% 2.83% 2.77% 
2010 0.53% 0.53% 0.52% 0.53% 0.53% 0.52% 
2011 0.15% 0.15% 0.15% 0.15% 0.15% 0.15% 
2012 0.07% 0.07% 0.06% 0.07% 0.07% 0.07% 
2013 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 
Missing 13.68% 1.59% 3.98% 2.02% 0.00% 2.02% 
Truncated 0.11% 0.02%  0.00% 2.45% 0.41%  0.00% 
 
  
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
 Bottom 
Quartile 
Median Top 
Quartile 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Number of 
Observations 
Application 
Date Loan-
to-Value 
.420 .640 .880 .631 .256 28061 
Current 
Loan-to-
Value 
.620 1.02 1.42 1.04 .570 28377 
Application 
Date 
Payment-
to-Income  
.290 .340 .370 .336 .141 25549 
Current 
Payment-
to-Income 
.280 .380 .540 .471 .351 27879 
Application 
Date Net 
Income 
€2664 €3517 €4473 €3843 €3390 27725 
Current Net 
Income 
€1802 €2529 €3480 €2840 €1868 27879 
  
Table 5: Correlation Matrix of the Explanatory Variables 
 LTV Application 
Date LTV 
Affordability Application 
Date 
Affordability 
Log Income Application 
Date Log 
Income 
LTV 1.000      
Application 
Date LTV 0.655 1.000     
Affordability 0.113 0.039 1.000    
Application 
Date 
Affordability 0.081 0.020 0.109 1.000   
Log Income 0.076 0.012 -0.556 0.073 1.000  
Application 
Date Log 
Income 0.123 0.096 0.014 0.012 0.164 1.000 
 
  
 Table 6: Default rates for loans doubly-sorted by loan-to-value, payment-to-
income and net income: Full Sample 
6a: Default rates for loans sorted by loan-to-value and affordability 
  Low Payment-to-Income 
Moderate Payment-to-
Income 
High Payment-to-
Income 
Low LTV 43.43% 39.04% 46.03% 
Moderate LTV 41.55% 43.98% 57.34% 
High LTV 47.40% 56.47% 70.55% 
 
6b: Default rates for loans sorted by loan-to-value and net income 
  High Income Moderate Income Low Income  
Low LTV 31.91% 40.26% 48.85% 
Moderate LTV 39.11% 47.40% 56.63% 
High LTV 51.34% 59.78% 69.13% 
 
6c: Default rates for loans sorted by affordability and net income 
 High Income 
Moderate 
Income Low Income 
Low Payment-to-Income 38.40% 42.02% 51.39% 
Moderate Payment-to-
Income 45.11% 47.31% 60.27% 
High Payment-to-Income 58.50% 48.36% 60.81% 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 7: Proportions of Loans in Default for Subcategory of Loan-to-value and 
Increased/Decreased Affordability 
Loan Type Change in 
Affordability 
Low Loan-to-
value 
Moderate Loan-
to-value 
High Loan-to-
value 
Full Sample Increased 
Affordability 
31.00% 40.89% 49.92% 
Decreased 
Affordability 
37.41% 49.48% 63.83% 
Home Loans Increased 
Affordability 
31.09% 41.49% 50.72% 
Decreased 
Affordability 
37.72% 49.18% 63.56% 
Buy-to-Let Loans Increased 
Affordability 
28.07% 33.03% 41.63% 
Decreased 
Affordability 
33.33% 51.16% 65.93% 
Table 8: Probit Model of Default with Six Explanatory Variables 
8a: Full Sample 
Variable Coefficient Std Error T-Stat Significance 
App Affordability -0.063 0.058 -1.081 0.280 
App LTV -0.617 0.043 -14.261 0.000 
App Log Income 0.016 0.011 1.471 0.141 
Affordability 0.312 0.031 10.170 0.000 
LTV 0.620 0.022 28.443 0.000 
Log Income -0.192 0.019 -10.310 0.000 
Constant 0.901 0.159 5.664 0.000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.059  
Number of  
observations 
25116  
  
8b: Home Loans 
Variable Coefficient Std Error T-Stat Significance 
App Affordability -0.078 0.066 -1.184 0.236 
App LTV -0.619 0.046 -13.531 0.000 
App Log Income 0.019 0.021 0.895 0.371 
Affordability 0.225 0.043 5.274 0.000 
LTV 0.628 0.023 26.865 0.000 
Log Income -0.207 0.026 -7.965 0.000 
Constant 1.024 0.197 5.200 0.000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.054  
Number of  
observations 
22474  
  
8c: Buy-to-Let Loans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Coefficient Std Error T-Stat Significance 
App Affordability 0.043 0.135 0.318 0.750 
App LTV -0.564 0.143 -3.930 0.000 
App Log Income 0.021 0.013 1.663 0.096 
Affordability 0.551 0.068 8.132 0.000 
LTV 0.578 0.063 9.135 0.000 
Log Income -0.205 0.048 -4.222 0.000 
Constant 0.772 0.438 1.763 0.078 
Pseudo R-squared 0.115  
Number of  
observations 
2642  
  
Table 9: Probit Model of Default with Four Explanatory Variables 
9a: Full Sample 
Variable Coefficient Std Error T-Stat Significance 
Marginal 
probability at 
average values  
Average of 
pointwise 
marginal 
probability 
App LTV -0.394 0.039 -10.096 0.000 -0.15694 -0.2069 
Affordability 0.227 0.027 8.312 0.000 0.09028 0.11901 
LTV 0.452 0.019 23.857 0.000 0.18012 0.23744 
Log Income -0.237 0.017 -14.331 0.000 -0.09427 -0.12427 
Constant 1.484 0.136 10.932 0.000 
  Pseudo R-squared 0.044  
Number of  
observations 
27568  
  
9b: Home Loans 
Variable Coefficient Std Error T-Stat Significance 
Marginal 
probability at 
average values 
Average of 
pointwise 
marginal 
probability 
App LTV -0.383 0.041 -9.292 0.000 -0.15243 -0.19891 
Affordability 0.093 0.036 2.565 0.010 0.03689 0.04814 
LTV 0.458 0.020 22.585 0.000 0.18248 0.23813 
Log Income -0.275 0.021 -13.239 0.000 -0.10964 -0.14307 
Constant 1.825 0.170 10.725 0.000 
  Pseudo R-squared 0.039  
Number of  
observations 
24515  
  
9c: Buy-to-Let Loans 
Variable Coefficient Std Error T-Stat Significance 
Marginal 
probability at 
average values 
Average of 
pointwise 
marginal 
probability 
App LTV -0.425 0.131 -3.247 0.001 -0.16893 -0.19999 
Affordability 0.491 0.058 8.502 0.000 0.19534 0.23126 
LTV 0.483 0.056 8.588 0.000 0.19204 0.22735 
Log Income -0.210 0.042 -4.974 0.000 -0.08373 -0.09912 
Constant 1.089 0.379 2.875 0.004 0.43316 0.5128 
Pseudo R-squared 0.102  
Number of  
observations 
3053 
  
Table 10: Logit Model of Default with Four Explanatory Variables 
10a: Full Sample 
Variable Coefficient Std Error T-Stat Significance 
App LTV -0.724 0.066 -10.954 0.000 
Affordability 0.361 0.046 7.875 0.000 
LTV 0.797 0.034 23.335 0.000 
Log Income -0.406 0.027 -14.922 0.000 
Constant 2.572 0.223 11.545 0.000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.046  
Number of  
observations 
27568  
  
10b: Home Loans 
Variable Coefficient Std Error T-Stat Significance 
App LTV -0.712 0.070 -10.193 0.000 
Affordability 0.125 0.060 2.085 0.037 
LTV 0.811 0.037 22.069 0.000 
Log Income -0.467 0.034 -13.703 0.000 
Constant 3.123 0.279 11.211 0.000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.040  
Number of  
observations 
24515 
  
10c: Buy-to-Let Loans 
Variable Coefficient Std Error T-Stat Significance 
App LTV -0.738 0.217 -3.393 0.001 
Affordability 0.843 0.102 8.286 0.000 
LTV 0.860 0.100 8.601 0.000 
Log Income -0.407 0.073 -5.543 0.000 
Constant 2.225 0.649 3.430 0.001 
Pseudo R-squared 0.106       
Number of  
observations 
3053 
       
  
Tables Appendix 
Table A.1: Default rates for loans doubly-sorted by loan-to-value, payment-
to-income and net income: Home loans 
A.1.a: Default rates for loans sorted by loan-to-value and affordability 
  Low Payment-to-Income 
Moderate Payment-to-
Income 
High Payment-to-
Income 
Low LTV 43.70% 39.44% 45.77% 
Moderate LTV 42.70% 44.57% 56.97% 
High LTV 48.40% 56.84% 70.69% 
 
A.1.b: Default rates for loans sorted by loan-to-value and net income 
  High Income Moderate Income Low Income  
Low LTV 32.70% 40.11% 48.63% 
Moderate LTV 38.67% 46.83% 55.69% 
High LTV 51.08% 59.41% 67.97% 
 
A.1.c: Default rates for loans sorted by affordability and net income 
  High Income Moderate Income Low Income  
Low Payment-to-Income 39.37% 43.08% 45.69% 
Moderate Payment-to-
Income 45.28% 47.43% 59.59% 
High Payment-to-Income 58.59% 48.32% 59.66% 
 
  
Table A.2: Default rates for loans doubly-sorted by loan-to-value, payment-
to-income and net income: Buy-to-let loans 
A.2.a: Default rates for loans sorted by loan-to-value and affordability 
  Low Payment-to-Income 
Moderate Payment-to-
Income 
High Payment-to-
Income 
Low LTV 33.78% 31.21% 47.89% 
Moderate LTV 27.95% 37.50% 58.35% 
High LTV 39.10% 51.53% 70.04% 
 
A.2.b: Default rates for loans sorted by loan-to-value and net income 
  High Income Moderate Income Low Income  
Low LTV 27.49% 43.90% 57.14% 
Moderate LTV 40.29% 53.44% 69.85% 
High LTV 52.15% 64.78% 85.00% 
 
A.2.c: Default rates for loans sorted by affordability and net income 
  High Income Moderate Income Low Income  
Low Payment-to-Income 31.44% 38.29% 53.08% 
Moderate Payment-to-
Income 36.07% 43.94% 62.06% 
High Payment-to-Income 50.00% 51.85% 73.86% 
 
  
Table A.3: Partially-linear Index Probit Model of Default with Four 
Explanatory Variables 
 Full Sample Home Loans Buy-to-Let Loans 
Variable Estimated 
Coefficient 
with 
Standard 
Probit 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
with Partially 
Linear Index 
Probit 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
with 
Standard 
Probit 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
with Partially 
Linear Index 
Probit 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
with 
Standard 
Probit 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
with Partially 
Linear Index 
Probit 
App LTV -0.394 -0.471 -0.383 -0.466 -0.425 -0.434 
Affordability 0.227 0.227 0.093 0.086 0.491 0.497 
LTV 0.452 Nonparametric 0.458 Nonparametric 0.483 Nonparametric 
Log Income -0.237 -0.241 -0.275 -0.283 -0.210 -0.217 
Constant 1.484 N/A 1.825 N/A 1.089 N/A 
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Figure 1: Comparative Time Series of Irish Residential Property Price 
Index, Unemployment Rate, Per-capital Real Income and Home Loan 
Default Rate  
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Figure 2: Local Proportion of Loans in Default as a Function of Loan-to-
Value 
All 
Loans 
Home 
Loans 
BTL 
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Figure 3a: Restricted and Unrestricted Nonparametric Estimation of the 
Probability of Default as a Function of Loan-to-Value, All Loans 
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Probability of 
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Figure 3b: Restricted and Unrestricted Nonparametric Estimation of the 
Probability of Default as a Function of Loan-to-Value, Home Loans 
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Figure 3c: Restricted and Unrestricted Nonparametric Estimation of the 
Probability of Default as a Function of Loan-to-Value, BTL Loans 
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Figure 4a: Linear and Semiparametric Estimates of the Contribution of 
Loan-to-Value to the Default Decision Index, All Loans 
Semiparametric 
Estimate 
Linear Estimate 
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Figure 4b: Linear and Semiparametric Estimates of the Contribution of 
Loan-to-Value to the Default Decision Index, Home Loans 
Semiparametric 
Estimate 
Linear Estimate 
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Figure 4c: Linear and Semiparametric Estimates of the Contribution of 
Loan-to-Value to the Default Decision Index, Buy-to-Let Loans 
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